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Abstract 
The essential resilience capabilities – monitoring, responding, learning and anticipating -  have all in common 
the need for relevant signals and the ability to transform them into action. However, this transformation is 
often lacking as seen from accident analyses revealing disturbances that are either not noted or ignored in the 
process leading up to the undesired result. This paper proposes to focus on signals occurring because of 
movements from and to system boundaries and use them for team reflection. The reflection is expected to 
make implicit knowledge explicit, being a first step of the needed transformation to action. An observational 
study is designed at a rail control post where rail signal operators reflect at the end of their shift. They reflect 
on the punctuality boundary through an on-line application, called the Resiliencer-punctuality. The application 
presents delay-development of trains, during a shift, with respect to a previous chosen period. Furthermore it 
provides search instruments to find specific trains of interest stimulating the reflection. A verbal analysis 
method is used to analyze the reflection discussion and to show a relation to resilience through learning and 
anticipating intentions. In addition we seek for repetitive elements in different cases to prove the learning 
potential. The observation designed should support the hypothesis that team reflection, on movements 
towards boundaries, increases resilience of the rail socio-technical system. 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Resilience engineering researches, among other aspects, the ability of a socio-technical system to reorganize 
and adapt to the unexpected and unforeseen (Hollnagel, Woods, & Leveson, 2006). Hollnagel (2009) theorizes 
that a sociotechnical resilience system needs four essential capabilities: responding, monitoring, learning and 
anticipating. These capabilities differ in moment and scope – actual, critical, factual and potential – but have in 
common the need for 1) relevant signals and 2) the ability to transform them into action. This transformation 
is often lacking as seen from accident analyses revealing disturbances that are either not noted or ignored, 
leading up to the undesired outcome (Hall, 2003; Stanton & Walker, 2011). The sharp end can play an 
important role in this transformation. Cowley & Borys (2014) describe an organizational elasticity model with 
competent and knowledgeable workers at the sharp end to respond to drifts of performed work (Dekker, 
2011; Hollnagel, 2008; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). Bracco, Piccinno, & Dorigatti (2014) go further by presenting 
nine steps to progress from the individual at the sharp end to the organization at the blunt end. However, it is 
not clear from the studies described above where the signals are identified and how they are transformed into 
explicit knowledge the organization can act upon. Signals appear throughout normal processes, having a large 
variability and are not necessarily related to the resilience of the system causing a large efficiency-
thoroughness-trade-off (Hollnagel, 2009a). In an earlier study (Siegel & Schraagen, 2014b), we proposed to 
focus on signals related to the system boundaries to reveal resilience changes. Focusing on these resilience-
related signals reduces the signal trade-off effort but still needs a process to turn them into resilient behavior - 
learning and anticipating. In this paper, we suggest to use team reflection to increase the amount of explicit 
knowledge, relevant to system resilience, enabling learning and anticipation. Team reflection (Ellis, Carette, 
Anseel, & Lievens, 2014; Reymen, 2003; Schippers, Den Hartog, & Koopman, 2007; Schippers, Edmondson, & 
West, 2014; West, 2000; Wiedow & Konradt, 2010), includes behaviors such as questioning, analysis, making 
use of knowledge explicitly, reviewing past events with self-awareness, and coming to terms over time with a 
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new awareness (West, 2000). Team reflection, in a loop with planning and action, is used in a broader reflexive 
process (West, 2000) where team members collectively reflect upon the team’s objectives, strategies, and 
processes. However, the team reflection proposed here goes beyond the team’s span of control, which is 
located at the sharp end, knowing details not seen by the rest of the organization. The question arises whether 
team reflection exposes knowledge beyond the responsibility of the team and whether it adds to the existing 
explicit knowledge. Thus, the main aim of this paper is to develop theory and method, and design an 
observational study in a rail system environment to verify the effectiveness of the proposed method. In the 
next section, we describe the theory and method for use in the operational environment. Next, we describe 
the rail environment of the study including proposed processes. We end with a discussion on the expected 
results. 
2 METHOD 
We describe at first the setting to understand the context of the methods. A Dutch rail-post responsible for the 
area North and West of Amsterdam with about fifty rail stations and thousand daily train trajectories. The 
work, performed 24/7, assigned to rail signalers during the day across four workstations. The rail signalers 
have to monitor the system planning and execution. During disruptions, they adjust the planning, manually 
direct the system and follow safety procedures and protocols including communication with train drivers and 
other personnel. They enter information about every train delay of more than three minutes through a 
dedicated application on the cause of the delay. This is the only place where they capture their knowledge 
about the system. The rail signalers perform their tasks and go home after their shift without any organized 
discussion about their work. Due to large disruptions they may be approached for questioning. The team 
reflection method of the rail signalers at the end of their shift is a new activity described in the next 
subsection. The following subsection describes the method used in the reflection-tooling and the last 
subsection describes the analysis method used to classify verbal expressions during the reflection. 
2.1 Team reflection of rail signal operators at the end of their shift 
The team mentioned in this paper, is a group of rail signal operators working together during a shift at a rail 
control post. Team reflection has mainly been investigated with respect to the performance of the team itself. 
West (2000) defines the team reflection subject as the group’s objectives, strategies (e.g., decision making) 
and processes (e.g., communication). The results of such a reflection can be fed back into the planning and 
action/adaptation loop to improve team performance such as their information processing (Schippers et al., 
2014). However, in our case the objective of reflection is to transform implicit to explicit knowledge, at the 
sharp end, relevant to the resilience state of a socio-technical system. This knowledge goes beyond the direct 
responsibility of the team. Implicit knowledge is tacit knowledge, a form of private knowledge that is treated 
as “informal,” and even, in a sense, “unconscious” knowledge (Day, 2005; Polanyi, 1969), that can be 
transformed to explicit knowledge (Frappaolo, 2008). We are interested in the implicit knowledge, relevant to 
system resilience, acquired throughout the regular work of the signalers. Resilience is about the behavior of 
the socio-technical system (STS) when it approaches and passes its boundaries (Siegel & Schraagen, 2014a; 
Woods, 2006). We assume that resilience related knowledge is released when the subject of team reflection is 
the movements towards and from those boundaries. We depict the proposed in figure 1. The signal operators 
interact individually with the rail STS, where they are part of as well. Throughout the interaction they gain 
individual implicit knowledge on the rail STS, which is partially made explicit through data entry by the 
signalers themselves into the system. Through the reflection they exchange some of their implicit knowledge, 
causing it to become explicit. 
 
 
Figure 1 After shift reflection 
3 
2.2 Movements towards and from the performance (punctuality) boundary 
In order to motivate the team reflection on topics related to resilience, we suggest to reflect on movements of 
the Operating System (OS) towards and from the boundaries as described previously (Siegel & Schraagen, 
2014a, 2014b). In this paper, we focus only on the performance boundary and particularly punctuality. 
Performance in the rail sector is a combination of punctuality and capacity.  In the short term only punctuality 
plays a role since capacity is nearly constant through its year planning. Punctuality of rail operations is well 
defined as the difference between planned (i.e. according to the latest published timetable) and actual 
moments of arrival or departure from a specific station (Goverde, 2005; Hansen, 2010). However in our case, 
we deal with many stations in a large area, many trains, different routes and shift periods, which need an 
extended punctuality definition to distinguish well between all these ingredients. This definition is the basis for 
the presentation and analysis during reflection. The context is a control area A and m stations Sj , j=1, …, m. In 
this area are nA trains, Ti i=1,…, nA, driving during de shift period between 𝑡𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑡
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 and 𝑡𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑡
𝑒𝑛𝑑 . Train Ti has at 
station Sj a punctuality of 𝑃𝑖,𝑗 = 𝑡𝑖,𝑗
𝑎𝑐𝑡,𝑑𝑒𝑝/𝑎𝑟𝑟
− 𝑡𝑖,𝑗
𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛,𝑑𝑒𝑝/𝑎𝑟𝑟
 being positive when the train is delayed. Where 
𝑡𝑖,𝑗
𝑎𝑐𝑡,𝑑𝑒𝑝/𝑎𝑟𝑟
 is the actual moment of arrival (arr) or departure (dep) of train Ti at station Sj  and 𝑡𝑖,𝑗
𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛,𝑑𝑒𝑝/𝑎𝑟𝑟
 is 
the planned moment. The train Ti has a route starting at station SBj and ending at station SEj where 𝑆𝐵𝑗 , 𝑆𝐸𝑗 ∈
{𝑆𝑗 , 𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑚}  ∈ 𝐴. The punctuality of train Ti at the start of its route in area A (station SBj) is: 𝑃𝑖,𝐵𝑗 =
𝑡𝑖,𝐵𝑗
𝑎𝑐𝑡,𝑑𝑒𝑝 − 𝑡𝑖,𝐵𝑗
𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛,𝑑𝑒𝑝
 and at the end of his route (station SEj) 𝑃𝑖,𝐸𝑗 = 𝑡𝑖,𝐸𝑗
𝑎𝑐𝑡,𝑎𝑟𝑟 − 𝑡𝑖,𝐸𝑗
𝑝𝑙𝑎𝑛,𝑎𝑟𝑟
 . A train, in this context, 
is defined as delayed when (𝑃𝑖,𝐵𝑗  𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝑖,𝐸𝑗) ≥  𝑡𝑑, where td is a time duration set by de rail sector. In our case td 
= 3 min. This definition causes delays of train Ti within its trajectory at area A not be accounted as a delay.  
Team reflection needs an indication on the performance of the trains within area A. We have chosen to 
calculate the punctuality increase of delayed trains during the shift. We present its relation to the same 
parameter during a reference period, which is the last week, month or year. 
The increased punctuality of train Ti in area A is ∆𝐴𝑃𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖,𝐸𝑗 − 𝑃𝑖,𝐵𝑗  . The average increased punctuality of 
delayed trains Ti in area A during shift period between 𝑡𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑡
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 and 𝑡𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑡
𝑒𝑛𝑑  is  ∆𝐴𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅?ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑡 =
1
𝑛
∑ ∆𝐴𝑃𝑖,𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑡
𝑛
𝑖=1  where n 
is the number of delayed trains driving in area A within the shift interval 𝑡𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑡
𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑡 ≤ 𝑡𝑖,𝐵𝑗
𝑎𝑐𝑡,𝑑𝑒𝑝 𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑖,𝐸𝑗
𝑎𝑐𝑡,𝑎𝑟𝑟 ≤ 𝑡𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑡
𝑒𝑛𝑑   
causing trains, crossing the shift boundary, counted in both shifts. The average increased-punctuality of 
delayed trains in area A during a reference period of shifts is  ∆𝐴𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅?𝑒𝑓  . 
Movements towards the punctuality boundary are identified through the relation between ∆𝐴𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅?ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑡  and 
 ∆𝐴𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅?𝑒𝑓 . When the first is larger than we talk about, a movement occurs towards the boundary, otherwise the 
movement is away from the boundary. 
We have transformed the above into an application called the Resiliencer-punctuality (fig.2). The application 
has two main modes: Live and Analysis. Live mode presents in real-time the comparison between ∆𝐴𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅?ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑡  and 
 ∆𝐴𝑃̅̅ ̅̅ ?̅?𝑒𝑓 . Analysis mode freezes the live data and allows searches for particular trains and punctuality increase. 
The results are split in passenger and freight trains, since both have a different characteristic concerning time 
delays. Passenger trains are tightly coupled to the on-line published time-table, while freight deviates much 
easier and has a lower punctuality priority. We have split the controlled area into four main trajectories. This 
helps to understand the results of the whole area. On the right hand side of the live mode display are the four 
trajectories. In the analysis mode we integrate search functions to focus on a particular train of interest. We 
present a graph of its trajectory with its delays (see lower right window in the analysis mode display).   
 
              
Figure 2 The Resiliencer-punctuality in live mode (left) and analysis mode (right) 
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2.3 Verbal analysis 
To analyze implicit to explicit knowledge transformation during team reflection, we use the verbal analysis 
method. This method quantifies subjective or qualitative coding of verbal utterance contents (Chi, 1997). In 
contrast with the verbal protocol analysis (Ericsson & Simon, 1993), which focuses on capturing the process of 
problem solving to gain knowledge, the verbal analysis focuses on capturing the representation the solver has. 
In our case, there is no direct problem solving, but knowledge is presented by the participants throughout the 
reflection, which is shared by the team and needs a methodology to be captured. To uncover what a 
participant knows and shares with a colleague needs analysis of the verbal utterances. We propose the 
following steps to achieve a set of propositions, along with a procedure to organize the verbal content. 
1. Reducing the protocols 
The rail operations are organised around train numbers, which are uniquely defined during a day by 
its route and order of appearance on the route. These train numbers, which are central in the 
Resiliencer-punctuality as well, are taken as the definition of discussion cases. In all discussions, we 
assume an initial or leading train number, which we will use to split the discussion in cases and rank 
them in order of discussion length. The analysis will be concentrated on the longest discussion cases, 
assuming most knowledge transfer, thus most interesting for this research. 
2. Segmenting the cases into semantic features, such as ideas, argument chains, or topics of discussion.  
This approach of semantics was also used by Chi (1997) and preferred over the non-content 
segmentation unit of a sentence, or a part of it.  Because of two reasons: 1) an idea might need 
several sentences to convey and 2) the same idea might be repeated several times and should be 
recognized and treated as such. This content segmentation has a subjective bias and should therefore 
be segmented and compared to  a second researcher as done for the coding of these segmentations. 
3. Coding of the segments 
The segments are coded by at least two coders and compared to each other. The following coding 
scheme will be used: 
 Type of segment content: 1) Fact ; 2) Reasoning {+ Depth of reasoning}; 3) Suggestion ; 4) 
Opinion; 5) None of the above 
 Coding used in the Dutch reporting system for allocating delays (relevant for comparison): 
 Transporter (train operator): 1) Rolling stock; 2) Personnel; 3) commercial process; 4) 
Train knock-on delays 
 Infrastructure operator: 1) Civil engineering; 2) Defect Infrastructure; 3) Traffic 
management 
 Third parties: 1) Weather; 2) (near) Collision; 3) Strike 
 Knowledge within span of team-control: Yes/No 
 
The analysis based upon the above coding will result in: 1) relation diagram of knowledge segments and 2) 
percentage of knowledge beyond the span of team control. The relation of knowledge segments will show the 
depth of reasoning, which is a type of learning (Felder & Henriques, 1995). The suggestions are a first step of 
anticipation. Learning and anticipation are both resilience cornerstones (Hollnagel, 2009b). 
3 OBSERVATIONAL STUDY DESIGN 
The study design at the Dutch rail-post described above, is about the introduction of team reflection (figure 3 
in the top-center). At the end of the rail signal operators’ duty (figure 3 in the center) they will discuss de- and 
increased delays within their controlled area. The will use for that the Resiliencer-punctuality (figure 3 left 
side). The application has been configured for the specific rail-post. It presents in live mode the punctuality 
status and provides in analysis mode the ability to search for logistic details (i.e. the delay progress of a specific 
train). The post-area has been split up into four main trajectories covering all stations and each trajectory is 
controlled by two workstations. This causes at least two rail signalers to relate to the results of a main 
trajectory. The results of the four trajectories are combined into results of the whole post during a shift. 
The four rail signalers on duty will stop their work an hour earlier, during the observational study period, for a 
reflection session together with their team leader. They will ask themselves the following generic questions: 
 Did our shift today proceed better than the average of last period? Why? 
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 What were the circumstances for the difference?  
 Which of the identified circumstances could occur again in the future? 
 What can we learn from that? 
 How can we deal with these circumstances and what can we do differently? 
For answering these questions, they can use the Resiliencer-punctuality and analyze the numerical punctuality 
progress in their area. However, reasoning beyond the numerical data can only be done with help of their 
personal knowledge and notes made during their shift (figure 3 in the center). We record the discussion and 
analyze it (figure 3 top right side) as described in the previous section. This will result in an explicit knowledge 
flow, reasoning, learning and action intentions (figure 3 bottom right side). We will compare these results with 
the explicit knowledge entered in the reporting system and verified through interviews (figure 3 bottom).  
 
Figure 3 Illustration of study design 
4 DISCUSSION 
The main challenge of the team reflection analysis is to show that explicit knowledge expressed during the 
reflection relates to resilience. Resilience is defined, among others, as the behavior of the STS near and beyond 
its boundaries (Woods, 2006). This leads to the assumption that knowledge arisen through discussion on 
movements towards and from these boundaries, relates to resilience by definition. However, this theoretical 
reasoning still needs confirmation. The first approach identifies cases where the system gets out of balance, 
which is a state related to resilience. In these cases we search for issues, which team reflection identified 
earlier in a previous case. A successful match proves the effectiveness of team reflection, however it needs 
coincidence. To enlarge our success rate in finding resilience-related knowledge, we use two more approaches. 
The first of these is comparing knowledge in the reporting system with explicit knowledge as result of team 
reflection. We assume that more and deeper reasoning of the latter improves the resilience of the system, 
since it can be of use when adaptation is needed. The second added approach is based upon Hollnagel's 
(2009b) cornerstones of learning and anticipation. We will seek for reasoning and induction with the new 
knowledge, being a component of learning (Felder & Henriques, 1995). Suggestions and opinions approve the 
intent for anticipation. The combination of these approaches should support the hypothesis that team 
reflection, on movements towards boundaries, increases resilience of the rail socio-technical system. 
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